This Soldier’s Witness to the Iraq Warfare Lie | by Frederic Wehrey


US Army soldiers guarding Iraqi detainees, 2003
Stan Honda/AFP through Getty PhotographsUS Military troopers guarding detainees throughout a raid on a home in Tikrit, Iraq, July 28, 2003

A number of weeks earlier than I deployed to Iraq as a younger US army officer, within the spring of 2003, my French-born father implored me to observe The Battle of Algiers, Gillo Pontecorvo’s dramatic reenactment of the Nineteen Fifties Algerian insurgency in opposition to French colonial rule. There are numerous political and aesthetic causes to see this masterpiece of cinéma vérité, not least of which is its portrayal of the Algerian capital’s evocative previous metropolis, or Casbah. One winter morning in 2014, greater than a decade after I first noticed the movie, I took a stroll down the Casbah’s rain-washed alleys and into the newer French-built metropolis. Scenes from the black-and-white film—just like the landmark Milk Bar café the place a feminine Algerian guerrilla units off a bomb that kills French civilians—jumped to life. The following French army response, memorably depicted within the movie, included arbitrary arrests, torture, and “false flag” bombings that solely infected the Algerian rebellion. 

It was these ethical perils of counterinsurgency that my father hinted at. “Preserve your eyes open,” he advised me. This was a prescient warning, one which served because the backdrop for my deployment, even when the Algerian analogy was imperfect and would turn out to be overused. As American troopers quickly confronted a guerrilla and civil conflict in Iraq for which they had been woefully ill-equipped, intellectually and militarily, The Battle of Algiers could be screened and discussed at the Pentagon. To this present day, it’s taught to West Level cadets as a cautionary story. 

Nonetheless, the complete weight of the movie’s classes was not obvious to me in Iraq till one morning in the summertime of 2003, after I obtained an pressing telephone name a few captured Iraqi intelligence officer. My commander needed me to go interview him on the Baghdad hospital the place he was being handled for unspecified wounds. 

I donned my Kevlar vest and grabbed my carbine for the journey to the so-called Inexperienced Zone within the metropolis middle, which was turning into more and more harmful due to bomb assaults and ambushes by a rising insurgency.

My very own expertise with this militancy was principally of a distant nature—although my encounters had been something however impersonal. As an intelligence officer, I debriefed Iraqi sources and informants on rebel teams and overseas fighters, which typically yielded detailed info that US troopers would use to conduct raids, searching for weapons, explosives, insurgents, or needed ex-regime figures. Since I learn the after-action stories of those operations, I realized the names and ages of those that had been captured. Typically, I even noticed pictures of their faces. This established a type of intimacy, a sequence of causality between my actions and their fates. 

In amassing the intelligence that drove these raids, I attempted to vet and confirm what I heard. Ninety % of the data I discarded after rounds of questions. A lot of it was outright fabrication by Iraqis in search of monetary reward or favors from the US army. Others had been attempting lure American troopers into serving to them settle private scores or eliminating their political, business, or sectarian rivals. The rest of the data typically proved legitimate. And the ensuing seizure of militants, weapons, or bomb-making supplies did save lives. 

From time to time, although, we didn’t sufficiently corroborate the data earlier than an assault, or we obtained the situation incorrect. Within the aftermath of such misdirected predawn raids on harmless Iraqi civilians, I remembered Pontecorvo’s movie and would ask myself: “What number of new insurgents did we simply create?” 

All of this was a departure from the unique focus of my deployment, which was to interview former Iraqi officers about Iraq’s suspected weapons of mass destruction (WMD). However as soon as the insurgency began attacking American troopers, Iraqis, and worldwide organizations, US army commanders demanded that extra intelligence sources be dedicated to penetrating the insurgents’ networks—particularly because the hunt for Saddam’s nuclear, chemical, and organic weapons was going nowhere.

Even so, I continued to chase down any leads I obtained on WMD. And that was what I assumed this name in regards to the detained Iraqi spy was about. As an alternative, after I obtained to the hospital room within the Inexperienced Zone, I discovered myself seated throughout from a person who had been on the middle of one of many greatest lies behind the US choice to invade Iraq. 

When Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani was posted to the Iraqi embassy in Prague within the late Nineteen Nineties beneath diplomatic cowl, he rapidly got here beneath surveillance by the Czech safety service. One morning in early April of 2001, an Arab informant working for the Czechs reported seeing al-Ani assembly with an Arab pupil on the Iraqi embassy. This pupil was recognized, in response to the report, as an Egyptian named Mohamed Atta—the person who, not lengthy after, grew to become the ringleader of the hijackers who carried out al-Qaeda’s terrorist assaults on the World Commerce Heart and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. 

The CIA and FBI later punched holes in this story; the Czech president himself subsequently repudiated it. To start with, the informant had recognized Atta as the person from the April 2001 assembly solely upon seeing his picture printed within the information after September 11. The FBI’s information of Atta put him in Virginia and Florida instantly earlier than and after the supposed Prague assembly, and the company uncovered no proof of worldwide journey. However none of this stopped the Iraq conflict hawks within the Bush administration from seizing on the so-called Prague Connection as proof of Saddam Hussein’s supposed complicity in terrorist assaults on American soil—and utilizing it as a casus belli for the 2003 invasion.

There on the Baghdad hospital, I joined an FBI agent in questioning the bedridden al-Ani about his time within the Czech Republic. A diminutive man with a grizzled face creased by bouts of ache, he epitomized the kind of drab regime functionary I’d come to know in Iraq all too effectively. He answered our questions straightforwardly. Ultimately, the hours-long session supplied no proof in regards to the Prague assembly to contradict the debunking that had already appeared in the press. Al-Ani had by no means met Mohamed Atta and even heard of him till he noticed information stories after September 11. Nor was he himself even in Prague on the day of the alleged encounter; he was out of city, seventy miles away. 

Much more disturbing than this non-revelation, although, was his account of his seize that summer time by US particular operations forces and the explanation for his hospitalization. Snatching him from his Baghdad residence at evening, US troopers had sure his wrists, coated his head, and compelled him to lie on the ground of a Humvee for the lengthy journey to a detention facility. Inside fifteen minutes of his confinement within the car, he felt an insufferable burning sensation. A Humvee’s engine is situated within the entrance and conducts warmth to the rear mattress, the place al-Ani was mendacity facedown on the naked steel. He twisted and writhed from the ache, however his American guards thought he was resisting. One of many troopers stepped more durable on his again along with his boot. “Jesus, Jesus, please,” he’d cried, he advised me, hoping that this invocation in English would get them to relent. 

In entrance of us within the hospital, he lifted his robe to indicate us the outcomes: extreme burns, in dark-hued patches, coated his abdomen, thighs, ft, and palms. As a consequence, al-Ani would endure three months of hospitalization, which concerned a number of pores and skin grafts, in addition to the amputation of his thumb and the lack of motion of a finger.

After the assembly, I relayed his account of those accidents to my commanding normal, who later reported the matter to a Senate inquiry into detainee abuses. The US Division of Justice additionally included the FBI’s account of this identical interview within the inspector normal’s 2008 report on detainee interrogations. And, over a number of years, the US Military investigated the incident, concluding that al-Ani’s accidents had been constant along with his story and that “the offences of Assault and Cruelty and Maltreatment was [sic] substantiated.” Regardless of that discovering, the Military dropped the case. 

To my information, no person was ever disciplined or punished for al-Ani’s mistreatment.

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It’s a merciless irony that this Iraqi man was first used as a prop for an American invasion after which subjected to disfiguring violence by troopers who had carried out that invasion. However his story weighs on me in different methods. The abuses we’ve seen in US policing have deep, homegrown roots, however I’m satisfied that also they are partly a results of the militarization of regulation enforcement born of the Iraq Warfare and America’s different overseas interventions. The Iraq catastrophe has rippled throughout just about each aspect of American life, deepening the inequalities that divide us, stirring a well-liked contempt for “experience” that has opened the door to demagoguery, and contributing to the hollowing-out of our infrastructure and establishments in ways in which have left the nation dangerously uncovered to future shocks. 

The Iraq debacle is what the journalist Robert Draper, in his engrossing current guide on the choice to oust Saddam, To Begin a Warfare: How the Bush Administration Took America into Iraq, appropriately calls the best American tragedy of the twenty-first century, alongside the assaults of September 11, 2001. What comes by way of in his account is the singular focus of sure administration officers to make use of these assaults as a rationale for the Iraq invasion. The disfigured Iraqi I’d debriefed had thus been a vital, early a part of that undertaking to “join the dots.”

In response to Draper, al-Ani grew to become a preoccupation for 2 Bush administration officers specifically: Vice President Dick Cheney and Deputy Secretary of Protection Paul Wolfowitz. Cheney had a “hard-on” for the Prague Connection, a CIA analyst advised Draper; and Wolfowitz grew to become an “obsessive fanatic” about it. 

Wolfowitz held a particular fascination for me. Years earlier than September 11, he’d embraced a fabulist theory about Saddam’s involvement within the 1993 World Commerce Heart bombing. And the smoke had hardly cleared from the September 11 assaults when he was already asking US intelligence companies for any indicators of an Iraqi hand. These queries grew in frequency and depth over the months that adopted, particularly after the Czech intelligence report got here to mild, even because the protection official’s quest left intelligence analysts exhausted and exasperated. 

“Wolfowitz requested the identical query alternative ways,” a CIA analyst associated to Draper, “partially as a result of we weren’t giving him the reply he needed—but additionally partly to show that we had been idiots.”

Paul Wolfowitz visiting Abu Ghraib prison, Iraq
Chris Helgren/AFP through Getty PhotographsUS Deputy Secretary of Protection Paul Wolfowitz inspecting a cell at Abu Ghraib jail, Baghdad, Iraq, July 20, 2003

Studying these pages of Draper’s guide introduced a tightening to my chest. I’d seen the human penalties of such single-mindedness—not solely within the accidents to this one Iraqi spy, but additionally within the anguish of numerous different Iraqis I’d met in 2003. And that hurt was solely the start, earlier than the world would study of Abu Ghraib, Haditha, and Nisour Square. Extra abstractly, although, Draper’s quantity angered me as a result of it confirmed how Wolfowitz, Cheney, and others had abused the craft of intelligence that had comprised the higher a part of my army profession—in Draper’s phrases, as “a drunk makes use of a lamppost, extra for help, moderately than illumination.”  

The obfuscation and denial of floor truths would proceed effectively after the US toppled Saddam.

“Have any of you ever had a tapeworm?” the French paratroop colonel asks his troopers in The Battle of Algiers, drawing a metaphor for the insurgency. “The tapeworm is a worm that may develop to infinity.” Slicing off the pinnacle of the enemy, the commander continues, is the one technique to cease its regeneration. 

In fact, this doesn’t occur within the movie, through which the French ultimately seek out the leaders of the Algerian resistance, any greater than it occurred when US troopers captured Saddam Hussein, on December 13, 2003, which occurred to be the day I left Iraq. The deposed dictator, although an object of nostalgia and veneration for some Sunnis, was by no means the primary figurehead of an more and more diffuse insurgency—what then-Protection Secretary Donald Rumsfeld famously derided as “dead-enders” and Wolfowitz later called “an unholy alliance of previous terrorists and new terrorists.” We struggled in these early days to outline who precisely we had been preventing, particularly with the inflow of overseas Sunni militants, a confusion epitomized by the farrago of politicized and unhelpful acronyms, like Former Regime Parts (FRE) or Anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF), that had been handed down for us to make use of in our stories.  

All of the whereas, one other overseas energy was exploiting our disarray. By the summer time and fall of 2003, I used to be getting sparkles from my Iraqi sources on the motion of Iranian intelligence operatives, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps forces, and even Hezbollah militia members in Iraq. This widening Iranian affect in Iraq was another unexpected consequence of the 2003 invasion. 5 years later, after I returned to Baghdad as a civilian adviser, I confronted near-weekly salvos of Iranian-supplied rockets.

Within the meantime, I attempted to neglect about Ahmed al-Ani and the numerous different Iraqi contacts, informants, and sources I’d encountered. They had been the sonar units that the US occupation utilized in an try to sound out a rustic and a society we solely vaguely understood. Amongst them had been, to make certain, snitches, hustlers, inveterate liars, embittered Ba’athists, possible Iranian double brokers, and soon-to-be insurgents, however additionally they included physicists, non secular students, college students, tribal elders, moms, and artists, whose lives had been upended by our invasion however who however typically gave us tip-offs, leads, intelligence, and, sometimes, the insights we lacked. Almost 20 years later, their types are nonetheless clear to me in define, however their options and the small print of their lives stay blurry and distorted, like divers within the depths glimpsed from the floor above.

The affliction of reminiscence persists, together with the ethical accidents borne by the innumerable American troopers who adopted me in Iraq, typically experiencing far worse bloodshed and trauma. These are an inevitable final result of conflict; so, too, is the ethical corruption of an open-ended occupation.

Colonel Mathieu in "The Battle Of Algiers" Film Still
Michael Ochs Archives/Getty PhotographsJean Martin because the French paratroop Colonel Mathieu in a scene from Gillo Pontecorvo’s The Battle of Algiers (1967)

“Ought to France stay in Algeria?” the French commander in Pontecorvo’s movie asks a pool of journalists inclined to query his brutal strategies. “If you happen to reply ‘sure,’ then you should settle for all the required penalties.” Likewise, nobody must be stunned when a overseas army presence engenders nationalist resentment and an armed rebellion, particularly when the occupation systematically dismantles governance establishments and disenfranchises swathes of the populace. There’s a scene Robert Draper describes of President Bush watching TV footage as coalition troops liberated Basra in April 2003 and asking an aide, of the Iraqis, “Why aren’t they cheering?”

Most members of the US army will shoulder the psychological and bodily dangers of being despatched to conflict, and most will settle for accountability for his or her actions as ethical brokers in conflict. What they count on in return, although, is a few assurance from their leaders that they were used wisely, and that they had been referred to as to the terrible job of inflicting violence solely after different means had been exhausted, and just for a trigger deemed very important to the nice of the nation. The absence of any such justification for the Iraq invasion—embodied within the spurious pretexts of WMD and linkages to al-Qaeda and undergirded by a hubristic ambition to reorder the Center East—is what makes it maybe essentially the most consequential tragedy of our occasions and a necessary lesson for the long run.   

I hope it’s one which our residents and leaders won’t ever tire of studying, from accounts like Draper’s, from histories but to be written, and from the testimonies of veterans and Iraqis alike, to keep away from one other ruinous journey.  

I’m not terribly optimistic.



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